While brotherhoods were associations of people trading in the same product or with the same occupations, membership did not depend on locale making geographic solidarity difficult. 10 Moreover, brotherhood rights to a place in a market were specific to each market since each market was controlled by a separate political authority. So, brotherhoods tried to extend their commercial rights to as many markets as possible and gain monopoly rights in a market if they could, but this was a complex process. A merchant or a group of merchants from a village, group of villages, or other geographic region might work together for mutual protection and profit to extend their rights. They would join a variety of brotherhoods since each commodity would have separate brotherhoods and access to each market or even region of markets might be controlled by different political authorities who gave privileges to different brotherhoods. Access to these markets depended upon the 7 Souryi, pp. 153-4. 8 Paper Mary Louise Nagata influence of the patron(s) of the sometimes multiple brotherhoods that members of the group belonged to. For example, the merchants of the Tokuchin estate in Omi province included members of the cloth, salt, paper and horse brotherhoods. They had the right to trade in a number of markets, each negotiated separately for each market and each brotherhood.
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Some markets had "home" brotherhoods that had monopoly rights over certain commodities in that market, but not over other commodities. There were also some large markets that had no "home" merchants or brotherhoods and accommodated outside brotherhoods in a variety of commodities. Brotherhoods that had "home" markets nevertheless traded at other markets too. So there could be a great deal of competition between brotherhoods trying to gain the right or monopoly rights to trade in one or another markets, but this was not the only area where brotherhoods competed against each other. Brotherhoods or merchant groups might also have to compete for the rights to use certain roads that led to other markets. The merchants of the Tokuchin estate, for example, had their goods confiscated by a brotherhood they were not a member of on the way to a market they had the right to trade in, but had not been to for several years. The other brotherhood claimed that the Tokuchin merchants did not have the right to use the road. This and other disputes were settled in courts where the patrons of the various brotherhoods competed to protect and extend the rights of their brotherhoods. 12 Brotherhoods also competed for access to raw materials with the final goal to establish a monopsony over a raw material necessary for the production of other commodities.
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Thus, merchants competed for access to membership in a variety of brotherhoods while brotherhoods competed with each other for use of or control over the roads that led to certain markets. Brotherhoods also competed for the right to trade in or even monopoly control of individual markets and likewise competed for access to and monopsony control of certain resources necessary to producing the commodities they traded in. Moreover, all of these rights and privileges depended upon having patrons with the power and influence to enforce them. Patrons also competed with each other in this legal and political arena since, during this period of increasing disunity, authority was diffuse and complex. Moreover, the income of the ways. During the medieval period, while the economy increasingly was a cash economy, the common currency was foreign coins: Chinese silver coins of the Ming or even the Song dynasties, and some Portuguese and Spanish reals and pesos.
However, there was not enough supply of foreign currency to keep up with the expansion of the domestic economy during the sixteenth century and more and more transactions were made in rice. The burgeoning silk textile industry sent much of the foreign currency flowing outside of Japan as Japanese merchants impo rted huge amounts of raw silk from China.
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The Tokugawa regime established a new framework for the Japanese economy based on rice and native currency minted by the government in gold, silver and copper. The gold, silver and copper brotherhoods were established to mint the coins and supply the domestic currency.
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Portuguese merchants, however, were also exporting 18-22 thousand tons of Japanese silver per year, so the Tokugawa regime made the export of silver that was not in the form of currency illegal. There was much smuggling, particularly by the Portuguese, and the Jesuit Society also exported huge amounts of silver in the form of donations. The Nagasaki silver brotherhood was established in 1609 to police the outflow of silver and control the smuggling that In summary, during the process of re-unification, the leaders of the newly unified Japan abolished commercial and craft brotherhoods as obstructing commercial market expansion and supporting private political power to rival the public power of the state. However, establishing new brotherhoods also became useful to the Tokugawa regime to centralize control of certain key industries, centralize state economic power and create the necessary framework for national markets. These early modern brotherhoods had the state as their patron and were granted monopolies for the purpose of state control rather than for personal profit allowing the state to control certain aspects of international trade, the monetary system and national standards of measurement. Members could not sell or lease these shares to brewers outside of the defined region. Of course, this also meant prohibitions agai nst unlicensed brewing which was enforced by confiscation of the tools for brewing. Society members therefore had a monopoly on brewing for their particular market, but membership meant both a license to brew and also limitations on how much and where they could brew and sell. There were also other kinds of brewing stock. Sake shipped to the Edo market, for example, was yet another brewing stock available to members of certain societies.
Shares of this stock were available for a price and these shares were separate from local market shares allowing access to more rice and production of greater volume.
Unlike the local shares, the Edo export shares could be sold or traded outside the region or market of the original license.
24
Although the state established certain stock societies for government convenience, spontaneous formation of commercial stock societies was banned in 1657. Nevertheless, ten Edo wholesalers spontaneously formed their own society in the Genroku era (1688-1704) for the purpose of establishing coastal shipping circuits and addressing maritime shipping problems in the face of losses due to pirates. In these activities, the society members pooled their investment in ships and shipping.
This society did not receive state recognition at first, but in the early eighteenth century the Tokugawa regime came to authorize such societies and even promoted 23 Yunoki Manabu, Sake zukuri no rekishi, pp. 47-8. 24 Yunoki Manabu, them.
In 1715, the state ordered wholesalers to form stock societies to control the coinage in circulation.
Silver had continued to be a problem in spite of the silver brotherhoods and silver continued to flow out of Japan in international trade, particularly due to the high demand for raw silk. Under the shogun Tsunayoshi (1680-1709), the regime fiddled with the quality of the silver used in the coinage, changing it several times. This resulted in great confusion in the market as to the actual value of coins as well as price inflation. After Tsunayoshi's death, there were efforts to bring the economy back in line and the authorization and requirement of wholesalers stock societies were a way to control the coins in circulation. These societies were also useful when the eighth shogun Yoshimune instituted controls to hold prices down in 1721 as part of his Kyoho reforms. At this time, far from discouraging stock societies, merchants, artisans and manufacturers in various occupations were required to form and join stock societies.
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One other way the stock societies were useful to the state was that they policed themselves. The regulations of most societies included that if one member violated a contract or cheated, the other members would not do business with him. Similar exclusions were applied to customers, suppliers or other business partners the members dealt with in their business. Another regulation was an agreement that no member would hire an employee that had been fired for misconduct by another member. Moreover, a former employee could only join the society as a full-fledged member if his former employer introduced him. These regulations served as mechanisms to enforce contracts and control misconduct, cheating and other corruption in commerce in a society that had both national markets and a decentralized political and legal system.
and not unilaterally pretend to represent the society, and to not t ake on new customers that had unpaid bills with other members.
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Although the societies had their own hierarchy of officers, they were in many ways egalitarian organizations and that is partly why the policing functions worked. This is particularly interesting since merchant federations formed on the stem and branch framework of a stem family lineage were hierarchical. Many a society, however, had both stem and branch members of a federation as equal members of the society thereby allowing the branch to act independently and facilitating the independence of the branch business. A society was a kind of community and the communal aspects became as important to members as the economic ones. A society provided insurance and assistance to its members, had its own festivals and ceremonies, and members even went on tours and enjoyed other leisure activities together.
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Since membership in a stock society was similar to a license to participate in a specific market and could also limit the members, the stock societies also became a vehicle for achieving and protecting monopoly rights and some groups spontaneously formed commercial stock societies hoping to establish monopoly rights and keep non-members out of their market. One example of this attempt is the Kyoto soy sauce brewers society.
The soy sauce brewers of Kyoto requested permission to form a stock society in 1755 for the purpose of "clearing up confusion in the market" as there were no standard units of measure used for the sale of soy sauce, no standards for pricing and they wanted to prevent any single or group of brewers from buying up and stockpiling the supplies necessary to brew soy sauce. No restrictions were placed on joining the society or the number of shares available except that when a former em ployee of a member wished to join, he needed to be introduced by that member.
The Kyoto soy sauce brewers' society had 176 members and was sub-divided into three large groups that were each further subdivided into 4-7 smaller groups. One month later the society requested and received permission to exclude brewers from outside of Kyoto thus giving the local brewers monopoly protection. This exclusion was granted, but never successfully enforced. The Kyoto brewers complained that the outside brewers were selling directly to retailers and the public, bypassing the wholesalers and brokers that the Kyoto brewers used. In response, the Bizen soy sauce wholesalers in Kyoto also organized their own stock society. There was some attempt later to absorb them into the local brewers society, but they refused to join. At the same time, brewers in Harima, Osaka, Omi and Sakai also exported soy sauce to Kyoto and likewise sold directly to the retailers and the public. These outside wholesalers then formed the outside soy sauce brewers society in 1772. After a major fire in 1788, the societies were dissolved and licensing requirements cancelled for a while to re-start the economy.
When the societies re -formed in the nineteenth century, a new requirement was added of one wholesaler and one retail shop for each brewery. At no time did the local brewers society succeed in preventing non-members from operating in the Kyoto market and the outside wholesalers representing major regional brewing industries actually came to dominate the Kyoto market by offering better quality at lower prices. So, this is an example of a stock society formed to establish and protect monopoly rights, but unable to successfully enforce them. One factor in the difficulty of enforcing those rights was that daimyo of domains exporting soy sauce to Kyoto also exerted pressure to allow the wholesalers to sell without joining the society.
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Apparently monopoly rights were not so easy to establish and enforce, even with a stock society.
During the latter half of the eighteenth century the Tokugawa regime required stock societies participating in the national market to pay dues and taxes to the state.
The regime also promoted more and more occupations to form stock societies and the expansion of their membership in an effort to expand production and commerce.
The Edo ten group wholesalers society authorized in the early eighteenth century, for example, expanded to sixty-five groups with 1,995 shares of stock by the nineteenth century. This policy also provided commercial revenue for the state while using the stock societies to enforce contracts and maintain the infrastructure for commerce. The stock societies were also expected to hold prices down, although many suspected them of using their monopolies to keep prices high. Under this belief, the stock societies were abolished in 1841 thinking that abolishing them would help to reduce prices. The consequences, however, were general confusion in the market and price inflation. So the stock societies seem to have been quite successful as a mechanism for government control of the market.
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In summary, stock societies acted as licensing mechanisms with membership representing, at minimum, license to operate a business in a specific market.
Mebership was defined as ownership of shares of stock and societies had various rules over who could become a member. These rules can be seen as the qualifications for a license. Membership could be either limited to a specific number of members or unlimited except to the qualifications for entrance. When shares were limited, stock societies could become monopoly associations with monopoly control of a market, but this was not always easy or possible to achieve.
While stock societies could form spontaneously for the cooperation of the members, many societies were established by the state with membership required.
The state used the stock societies to police the market using peer pressure and commercial or economic pressure to enforce contracts and police cheating or other criminal activities. The state also used stock soc ieties for the micro-management of the economy with regard to the money supply, the coinage in circulation, interest rates on loans, the rice absorbed by sake brewing, international trade, suppression of prices and other concerns. The state later found the dues and taxes paid by stock societies to be a convenient source of revenue, but this concern was likely secondary to the policing and economic management functions that also facilitated economic growth. For convenience, I use the description in Gary Richardson's article, "Medieval Guilds"
Brotherhoods and Stock Societies as
found in the EH.Net Encyclopedia.
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For this discussion, I will call the guilds of medieval Europe simply "guilds" and continue to call the other two organizations brotherhoods and stock societies.
One important characteristic of guilds is that of contract enforcement, both among members and between members and outsiders. Contract enforcement and policing of members was certainly one of the main functions required of stock societies by the Tokugawa state. The reason for the enforcement was not necessarily the community responsibility system as claimed for guilds, although
Tokugawa society also institutionalized community responsibility in its social system.
The medieval brotherhoods, however, were far more dependent upon their patrons and the abilities of their patrons to manipulate the courts in their favor, although certainly one function of medieval brotherhoods was addressing conflict and settling disputes between members. This function was also true for the non-commercial brotherhoods and village communities.
Guilds also protected their members from political authorities in other lands who might try to seize money and merchandise from foreign merchants as an easy source of income. The danger of attack and seizure of goods and merchandise in medieval Japan, however, came from other brotherhoods. This was one method brotherhoods used to defend and extend their commercial rights and privileges.
These disputes were ultimately fought out in the courts between the patrons of the brotherhoods. So, rather than the brotherhoods protecting their members from predation by political authorities, their patrons as political authorities protected the brotherhoods against predation by other brotherhoods. Under the Tokugawa regime as well, the only issue of predation was from pirates and bandits, and ultimately the legal and political authority of the state had responsibility for this protection. Indeed, the contract enforcement and policing aspects of the stock societies were part of the mechanism of legal protection.
Guilds were also known to have unusual influence in local governments. In Japan, neither the brotherhoods nor the stock societies had much political influence.
If anything, the political authorities had inordinate influence upon the brotherhoods and the stock societies, particularly under the Tokugawa regime where the state made use of the societies to manage the economy.
Like the guilds, the medieval Japanese brotherhoods tried to manipulate input and output markets to their own advantage establishing both monopoly rights in markets and monopsonies toward raw materials if possible. These practices were one factor behind the abolishment of the brotherhoods and the establishment of "free markets" during the sixteenth century. Under the Tokugawa regime, the state used the stock societies to limit and manage access to input and output markets as part of the state management of the economy. Instead, stock societies were more likely to establish reputations for quality, another strategy used by guilds. At the same time, stock societies had the possibility of monopoly control of specific ma rkets, but this was not always easy to enforce. Moreover, monopoly control usually suggests high prices, but one reason the state began to promote stock societies was to suppress prices and at least some societies had to apply for state permission to raise prices. The dramatic rise in prices after stock societies were abolished in 1841 is usually thought to prove the effectiveness of the state strategy to use the stock societies to suppress prices.
Little is known about the labor market during the medieval period of Japanese history, but labor included some combination of free and un-free labor as well as indentured labor. Stock societies during the Tokugawa period certainly tried to manage labor markets, especially to control the human capital of skilled labor.
However, commercial expansion from at least the latter part of the eighteenth century made labor a sellers market and the stock societies were more concerned with finding and maintaining labor supply than lowering wages. 
